In Gheorghe Vasile Silvesan v Manning Global Limited (ADJ-00062304), the Workplace Relations Commission (the “WRC”) considered the employment status of an individual engaged through a personal service company and assigned by a recruitment business to work for one of its clients. Despite the contractual arrangements was between two companies, of which the Complainant was described as the “personnel individual” of one, the Adjudicator, Catherine Byrne, found that the reality of the relationship was that of an employee and an employment agency. Accordingly, the Respondent was directed to pay the Complainant €7,134.00 in compensation in respect of unpaid wages.
It should be noted that the Respondent did not attend the hearing but did write to the WRC. Nevertheless, this decision provides a detailed analysis of the law and the application of the Supreme Court’s decision in The Revenue Commissioners v Karshan (Midlands) Limited t/a Domino’s Pizza [2023] IESC 24 (“the Karshan Decision”) together with the High Court decision in Ryanair DAC v. Aidan Reddy (in his capacity as Appeals Officer), the Chief Appeals Officer and the Minister for Social Protection [2024] IEHC 719 (“Ryanair v Reddy). Significantly, the decision demonstrates that the use of an intermediary company or an umbrella structure will not necessarily prevent an individual from being classified as an employee where the practical reality of the recruitment and the subsequent working relationship is consistent with employment.
Facts:
The Complainant worked as a data centre technician. In February 2025, he was contacted through LinkedIn by a recruiter working for the Respondent, Manning Global Limited. He agreed to be represented by the Respondent for a role with Huawei Technologies (Ireland) Limited (“Huawei”). Following interviews with Huawei, the Respondent offered him a one-year fixed-term position as a data centre manager, at a daily rate of €422.10.
The Complainant was informed that he would be engaged on a self-employed basis. The contractual and payment arrangements involved five parties: the Complainant, the Respondent, Huawei as the Respondent’s client, Skymaster Limited (“Skymaster”) as a personal service company, and Fenero as the finance, tax and payroll services provider. The contract was formally entered into between the Respondent and Skymaster, of which the Complainant was one of a number of directors. It identified the Complainant as the individual whose services would be supplied for the duration of the assignment.
The Complainant commenced work with Huawei on 3rd March 2025. He worked at Huawei’s premises, used Huawei’s facilities and laptop, reported to a senior manager in Huawei and was required to submit timesheets for approval. He was engaged at a fixed daily rate and carried out the work personally. However, it was the Respondent who paid Skymaster who in turn paid the Complainant.
In April 2025, the Complainant worked 21 standard days and claimed the equivalent of five additional days as overtime. His timesheet for 26 days was approved by his manager in Huawei. An invoice was subsequently issued by him for €10,974.60. However, the Respondent disputed the entitlement to overtime on the basis that the Complainant was a consultant rather than an employee.
On 9th May 2025, the Complainant resigned from his position due to his execessive workload and the conditions of his working environment, and he gave two weeks’ notice. The Respondent sought him to work the full 30-day notice period specified in the contract and told the Complainant that, if he did not comply with the contractual notice period, he risked not being paid for services already carried out. The Complainant refused on the basis that a number of the conditions of the contract had already been breached by the Respondent. The April invoice remained unpaid, and the Complainant brought a complaint under the Payment of Wages Act, 1991.
The Respondent did not attend the hearing but one week before the hearing, its business support manager wrote to the WRC stating that the Respondent had no direct agreement with the Complainant and maintained that any contractual relationship was with Skymaster. In the absence of direct evidence from the Respondent, the Adjudicator determined the complaint on the evidence presented by the Complainant.
Decision:
The first issue considered by the Adjudicator was whether the Complainant was an employee of the Respondent for the purposes of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991.
The Adjudicator found that the Respondent’s business activity fell within the definition of an “employment agency” under the Protection of Employees (Temporary Agency Work) Act, 2012. The Respondent had contracted the Complainant to work under the direction and supervision of Huawei, which was the Respondent’s client.
The Adjudicator then considered the definition of a “contract of employment” under the Payment of Wages Act. That definition includes a contract under which an individual agrees with another person to perform work personally for a third party, where the individual is not operating a profession or business undertaking of which the third party is a client or customer. The person liable to pay the individual’s wages is deemed to be the employer for the purposes of the Act.
The Adjudicator found that the Complainant had agreed with the Respondent to work for Huawei and that the Respondent had agreed to engage him at a daily rate of €422.10. Although the arrangements were structured through Skymaster and described the Complainant as a self-employed consultant, the Adjudicator considered that further examination of the reality of the relationship was required.
In determining the Complainant’s employment status, the Adjudicator applied the framework identified by Murray J in the Supreme Court in the Karshan Decision. The Adjudicator found that:
The Adjudicator concluded that the Complainant satisfied the first four elements of the framework set out in the Karshan Decision. As he did not work in a regulated sector, it was not necessary to consider the fifth step. The WRC determined that the reality of the Complainant’s relationship with the Respondent was that of an employee and an employment agency.
The Adjudicator made an interesting observation on the Karshan test as a whole, stating –
“that it is important not to shoehorn an analysis into Murray J’s five-step framework, and to omit certain other criteria that may point towards one form of employment over another. I am mindful of the dicta of Edwards J in The Minister for Agriculture and Food v. Barry that all the tests are potential aids for identifying the nature of the working relationship and no single test is definitive. This must also apply to the test in Karshan.”
The Adjudicator, contrary to the Karshan Decision, considered the “mutuality of obligation” test, stating that it is “no longer as critical as it was before Karshan” but it “remains an important criterion for determining employment status”. She held that in this case, the degree of mutual obligation in the Complainant’s relationship with the Respondent weighed more heavily in favour of him being an employee rather than an independent contractor.
The Adjudicator felt that a proper examination of the Complainant’s status would be incomplete without some reference to the decision in Ryanair v Reddy. She went through the similarities in the facts between that case and this case but ultimately distinguished the case based on the Complainant’s claim itself and the lack of regulations being relevant in this case.
The Adjudicator then considered the claim for unpaid wages. The evidence established that a Huawei manager had approved the Complainant’s timesheet for 21 standard days and five days of overtime in April 2025. At the agreed daily rate of €422.10, the gross amount due was €10,974.60.
The Adjudicator found that the decision not to pay the Complainant was connected to his refusal to work the full contractual notice period. The Adjudicator stated that there was no provision in law permitting an employer to deduct wages already earned because an employee refused to work their notice. The failure to pay the sum properly payable therefore amounted to an unlawful deduction under section 5(6) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991. However, she ordered that the Complainant is paid the net sum after deduction of payroll taxes which she calculated to be €7,134.
Takeaway for Employers:
This decision is an important reminder that the description given to a working relationship may not be decisive. An arrangement will not necessarily be treated as one of self-employment simply because a contract describes the individual as a consultant, payments are processed through an umbrella structure, or the individual is made a director of a personal service company.
This decision is particularly significant for recruitment businesses and other organisations that engage individuals through personal service companies. Where a recruitment business identifies a particular individual, places that individual with a client, agrees their rate of pay and remains responsible for payment, the arrangement may come within the statutory definition of an employment agency and the individual may be regarded as its employee for the purposes of applicable employment legislation.
The decision also illustrates the risks associated with withholding payment for work already completed because an individual has failed to work an agreed notice period. Even where an employer considers that an employee has acted in breach of contract by leaving without adequate notice, that does not of itself create a right to withhold wages which are properly payable. The Complainant did not look for pay for the period of notice that he did not work.
Employers and recruitment businesses should ensure that contractual documentation accurately reflects the intended arrangement and that the arrangement is consistent with how the relationship operates in practice. In this decision it was noted that it was the individual that was initially recruited via LinkedIn and not the company.
Careful consideration should also be given as to which entity is responsible for the payment of remuneration and the potential employment law obligations that may arise as a result.
Here, the fact that the Complainant did not have the right of substitution, and that the arrangements were not accurately reflected in the contract i.e. thus use of the end user’s equipment, that he worked exclusively for the end user during that period, added to context that he was in fact an employee. All of the circumstances as a whole allowed the Adjudicator to come to the decision to look beyond the corporate veil of what was initially described as a contractor relationship.
Although the Respondent did not attend the WRC hearing, this decision provides a useful indication of how complex agency, umbrella company and personal service company structures may be approached following the Supreme Court’s decision in Karshan and the High Court decision in Ryanair v. Reddy.
Link to Decision: ADJ-00062304
Authors – Jane Holian, Anne O’Connell
4th September 2026
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